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Three Strikes, Yet They Keep on Swinging: Athletes and Domestic Violence 
 
*Victoria Lucido  
 
I. Introduction 
“It’s going to be a lot harder for us to get out of trouble now. Three years ago, you smacked a 
girl around and people maybe said she asked for it. Now whether she asked for it or not, they’re 
going to haul you off.”1 – Bennie Blades, Safety, Detroit Lions  
Domestic Violence, generally, is defined as a pattern of abusive behavior in a relationship that 
is used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner.
2
 
Power and control techniques include, but are not limited to, using coercion and threats, 
intimidation, and isolation.
3
 An abuser can use economic abuse as well as emotional abuse, to 
gain control of his partner.
4
 Generally, domestic abuse exists when the two parties are related by 
blood, are married, or live within the same household.
5
 
 Some preliminary statistics to consider, according to the American Bar Association’s 
Commission on Domestic Violence, include:  
 One in four women in the United States will likely experience domestic violence during 
her lifetime.  
 Women account for 85% of the victims of domestic violence. 
 Young women, 16-24 years old, experience the highest rates of domestic violence 
 The number one killer of African-American women ages 15-34 is homicide at the hands 
of a current or former intimate partner. 
 Each year, an estimated 3.3 million children are exposed to violence by family members 
against their mothers or female caretakers.
6
 
The Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1824, held in Bradley v. State that husbands have the 
right to use “moderate chastisement” against their wives because a husband was held liable for his 
wife’s “misdeeds.”7 Bradley was overruled in Harris v. State in 1894.8 Since then, state 
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legislatures and the federal government have taken strides towards protecting women from 
domestic abuse. However, the question still remains, is this enough?  
Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 (“VAWA 2000”) as part of the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act.
9
 Through this act, victims of domestic 
violence can seek different kinds of protective orders. Protective orders are about restraining the 
batterer and protecting the partner who is the target of abuse.
10
 Other protective provisions 
include “stay away” and “no-contact” orders which require the abusive partner to stay away from 
his victim’s home, place of work, or other neighborhood locations, or a fixed distance from her at 
all times.
11
 Before the 1970’s, battered women had to initiate divorce proceedings before 
requesting an order, and until 1976, only two states had restraining order legislation specifically 
designed for battered women. By 1980, forty-five states had implemented legislation, which 
offered relief to victims of partner abuse.
12
  
Though domestic violence is an epidemic that needs attention from society as a whole, the 
analysis that follows will examine domestic violence through the lens of professional athletes and 
will demonstrate that these athletes are not being held accountable nearly as often as they should 
be for their heinous acts of abuse. Part II highlights individual case studies of professional athletes 
involved in public domestic violence disputes. Part III examines the reasons why domestic 
violence is not taken seriously among athletes and why it should be. Part IV offers legal remedies 
to the problem of athletes and domestic violence, while Part V proposes how to implement and 
strengthen previous attempts of the legal remedies.  
II. Case Studies 
Frequently victims of domestic violence do not want to proceed with charges against their 
abusers because they do not want their abusers to suffer severe consequences of the arrest, such as 
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loss of job or a damaged reputation.
13
 While 35% of emergency-room visits by women are for 
symptoms that may be the result of spousal abuse, as few as 5% of these victims are ever so 
categorized.
14
 An inordinate number of American women seem to trip and fall into hospitals over 
things that go bump in the night. “For every story printed, far more remain untold.”15  
This can be especially true in the case of professional athletes. It can be assumed that victims 
do not want to call the police and have their abusers arrested because they do not want their 
stories to end up on the 6 o’clock news or on the front page of a gossip magazine. The media 
began following domestic violence cases more closely after the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson 
in 1994.
16
 Thereafter, there was a growing sense among the public and prosecutors that it was 
preferable to intervene early in domestic violence cases, rather than wait for a homicide to occur. 
Federal legislation, such as VAWA, mentioned earlier, encouraged more aggressive prosecutions. 
“In no other arena, from academia to entertainment, from politics to industry- have more varied 
men been exposed as batterers than in the relatively small, if highly visible, world of sports.”17  
Biographer Jose Torres quoted Mike Tyson as having said that the best punch he has ever 
thrown was aimed at ex wife Robin Givens. Tyson also proclaimed “I like to hurt women when I 
make love to them…I like to hear them scream with pain, to see them bleed…it gives me 
pleasure.” 18 
On July 1, 1999, NFL Hall-of-Famer Jim Brown, then 61 years old, was charged with terrorist 
threat and vandalism after an argument with his wife, Monique Brown, then 23 years old.
19
 
According to the testimony of responding police officers, Monique called 911, and reported that 
her husband had a gun, had vandalized her car with a shovel and had threatened to kill her, after 
the couple argued about Jim Brown’s alleged infidelity.20 Several police officers responded to the 
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call. Upon the arrest of Jim Brown, the officers seized the loaded gun. Next to the gun were two 
knives and a box of ammunition.
21
 
The responding police officers subsequently testified that after Jim was arrested, Monique 
went to the police station for further questioning, where she disclosed that there had been a 
history of domestic violence in the relationship in the past. The officer also stated on the record 
that Monique had told the officers that she was afraid for her safety, which is why she placed the 
911 call.
22
 However, once Monique took the stand, her story changed dramatically. Monique 
stated that she had instigated the fight, and that she was never afraid. She also testified that, in 
fact, there had never been any incidents of domestic violence.
23
 
Interestingly enough, Monique Brown stated on “Larry King Live” on August 14, 1999, that 
she “gave Jim permission to strike her car.” She also stated on the television show that one of the 
reasons she instigated the argument was due to premenstrual syndrome (PMS).
24
  
After a jury trial lasting three weeks, the jury acquitted Brown of the terrorist threat charge, 
but convicted him of vandalism. Brown was initially sentenced to three years’ summary probation 
under various terms and conditions, including completing a 12-month batterer’s counseling 
program and paying $1,500 to a battered woman’s shelter. Brown, however, rejected the terms of 
probation, and was sentenced to six months in jail and a restitution fine of $100. Brown’s driver’s 
license was also suspended for one year.
25
  
One point worth mentioning is the fact that both on “Larry King Live” and in her court 
testimony, Monique Brown minimized the incident and placed a great deal of blame on herself.
26
  
Also noteworthy, is the fact that during this Larry King interview, Jim admitted to other acts of 
domestic violence during previous relationships. Additionally, Jim Brown would rather spend 
time in jail, than admit to having a problem with anger and violence. There is no doubt that some 
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act of violence occurred that day, as photographs of the smashed car windows were admitted in 
evidence.
27
 Jim Brown, in his version of the facts, stated that he smashed out the windows in the 
car immediately after a domestic argument because he was “frustrated.”28 
Although Jim ultimately served prison time, it was on his own accord, because he refused to 
accept the plea deal requiring him to recognize his problem with domestic violence. In 2002, film 
director Spike Lee released the film “Jim Brown: All-American; a retrospective on Brown's 
professional career and personal life.” On November 4, 2010, Jim was chosen by NFL Network 
as the second greatest player in NFL history. Today, Jim Brown is not remembered as a batterer; 
he is remembered as a hero. 
In August 2010, Sports Illustrated writer, Jeff Benedict, wrote an article called “A Double 
Standard When it comes to Athletes and Violence.”29 In this article, Benedict describes three 
domestic violence disputes that took place among professional athletes in that week alone. 
Indiana Pacers rookie Lance Stephenson, 19, was accused of assaulting his girlfriend by kicking 
her down the stairs, then slamming her head into a step.  In addition, then- Mets closer Francisco 
Rodriguez (K-Rod) was arrested outside the team's family lounge at Citi Field and charged with 
assaulting Carlos Pena, the 53-year-old grandfather of his infant twins. The Mets did not punish 
“K-Rod,” though he was ultimately traded to another team. The same day, former Carolina 
Panthers linebacker Mark Fields was arrested after he allegedly beat the mother of his 6-year-old 
daughter outside a childcare facility.
30
 
In his article, Benedict states that “it pays to be an athlete” when it comes to domestic 
violence. He argues that athletes do not fear consequences, as exhibited by their behavior.
31
 
Rodriguez and Fields both committed acts of domestic violence in public places, whereas 
domestic violence typically occurs behind closed doors. Benedict argues that leagues are afraid to 
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tackle domestic violence with a degree of seriousness, as exhibited by Bill Parcells, General 
Manager of the Miami Dolphins, when he failed to suspend player Phillip Merling after he was 
accused of striking his pregnant girlfriend and barricading her in a bathroom.
32
 
Jason Kidd, while playing for the Phoenix Suns, was involved in a domestic dispute with 
his wife in 2001. Kidd’s wife told the police that he hit her after an argument about their two-
year-old son. Kidd pleaded guilty to spousal abuse, was fined $200 and ordered to take anger 
management training. Kidd’s off court behavior did not result in direct punishment by his team, 
though he was later traded to a different team. The couple divorced several years later when Jason 
filed for divorce in 2007, accusing Joumana Kidd of “extreme cruelty.” 33 
Other professional athletes who have been tied to domestic violence claims include Brett 
Meyers, David Justice, O.J. Simpson, Barry Bonds, Jose Canseco, Darryl Strawberry, Dante 
Bichette and Albert Belle, to name a few.  
III. Reasons Why Domestic Violence is Not Taken Seriously, and Why it Should Be 
Are athletes more likely to abuse? The information is non-conclusive either way, however a 
study at two universities, Northeastern and University of Massachusetts, reviewed 107 sexual 
assault cases reported at 30 Division 1 universities between 1991 and 1993.
34
 Male college 
student-athletes were responsible for a significantly higher percentage of the sexual assaults as 
compared with the rest of the male student population. While male student athletes at ten of those 
schools made up only 3.3% of the total male population, they were responsible for 19.0% of the 
assaults.
35
  
It is difficult to gather data on player arrests and corresponding league discipline because the 
leagues do not publish this data and most of the studies are dated. However, from the data that has 
been gathered, it appears there are startlingly high arrest rates among NBA players. A records 
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check on forty two percent of the league’s players in the 2001-2002 season revealed that forty 
percent of them had either been arrested or recommended by police for indictment for a serious 
crime.
36
 A similar study six years earlier showed an arrest rate of twenty-one percent for NFL 
players.
37
 A player’s status as a professional athlete will likely affect the criminal sanctions 
imposed, such that preferential treatment “may encourage them to exercise less self-control and 
behave more violently towards woman than would other men.”38  
Some critics argue athletes are predisposed to commit acts of domestic violence and sexual 
assault because they are trained to use violence and intimidation for a psychological edge during 
their games and because sports create a “macho culture” which equates masculinity with 
violence.
39
  
In a 1992 essay entitled “Male Athletes and Sexual Assault,” Merrill Melnick, an associate 
professor at the State University of New York, wrote about athletes and this macho “sub-culture.” 
He posited that “aggression on the field, sexist language and attitudes used in the locker room and 
an inordinate need to prove one’s maleness can combine in complex ways to predispose some 
male athletes towards off-the-field hostility.”40 The pursuit of dominance lies at the heart of all 
athletic contests, and it happens to be the animating force behind the men who batter their 
women. Athletes are supposed to be brave, tough, dominant and aggressive. Part of this attitude is 
not to act like a woman, and not to respect them either.
41
 
Another theory behind the propensity of athletes to commit acts of violence against 
women more often than non-athletes is because it is difficult for athletes to “turn off” their 
aggression after the conclusion of the game.
42
 For example, an incident occurred between 
Chicago Bulls forward Scotty Pippen and his fiancé Yvette DeLeone, where he grabbed her arm 
and shoved her into a car in the garage in the home that they shared, the day after Chicago was 
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eliminated from the playoffs.
43
 Commentators also believe that athletes may feel that “the game” 
itself is more important than women or outside relationships. Jimmy Johnson admitted on 
television that he abandoned his wife of 26 years when he was coaching the Dallas Cowboys 
because “his commitment to the Cowboys was stronger.”44 Even particular league rules may 
convey to athletes that “the game” is more important than their wives, as demonstrated by the 
$125,000 fine Houston Oiler’s David Williams received when he missed a game to aid his wife in 
childbirth. However the fine was revoked following a strong public outcry.
45
  
 Another way athletes have celebrated their manhood is through degrading women, making 
women feel that the world of sports is an unreceptive environment for them.   
Back in 1978, on the day that the New York Yankees first reluctantly allowed female 
reporters into their clubhouse, the women who stepped into the hallowed room were 
greeted by a large cake sitting on a table. That pastry, designed by a Brooklyn baker, 
commissioned by a player, said all you need to know about the world of the locker 
room: The two-foot-long cake was in the form of a penis. Chocolate shavings, 
mimicking public hairs, were sprinkled around the part shaped like testicles. It was an 
unforgettably foul expression of the group contempt in which the intruders to the male 
bastion were held, and its message was clearer and more powerful than any homily 
ever hung on a locker room wall: Women Not Welcome Here-Hostile Territory.
46
 
 
In a similar instance, a high school football coach in Los Angeles painted the picture of a 
vagina on a tackling dummy to improve his players’ performance.47 Further, Bob Knight, Indiana 
basketball coach from 1971-2000, once put a sanitary napkin in the locker of a player whose 
maleness he was challenging. Even more startling than his behavior is a comment Knight made 
during a national television interview in 1998. Knight told Connie Chung that “If rape is 
inevitable, relax and enjoy it.”48 Knight is among the eight members of the Class of 2011 of the 
National Collegiate Basketball Hall of Fame.
49
 Though these are somewhat dated episodes, it is 
the foundation of the sexists ideals found among professional sports. 
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There are arguments refuting the theory that athletes are more prone to commit acts of 
domestic violence and sexual assault including the fact that it may seem this way because athletes 
have more opportunities to do so because they tend to be around more women, are often traveling, 
and can be the target of unfounded claims. It is possible that athletes may be the targets of false 
claims because of their deep pockets and their accusers wish to gain their “fifteen minutes of 
fame.”50 However, non-athletes are also falsely accused of sexual assault. 
Though the evidence is inclusive as to whether or not athletes abuse their wives or girlfriends 
more often than non-athletes, there is evidence that athletes are not prosecuted by the criminal 
justice system as harshly or consistently as their general public counterparts.
51
  This seemingly 
preferential treatment from disciplinary authorities may help encourage athletes to exercise less 
self-control. A comprehensive study by Jeff Benedict, as former director of research at the Center 
for Sport in Society, found that 172 athletes were arrested for sex felonies between 1986 and 
1995, yet only thirty-one percent were successfully prosecuted. The study also concluded that 150 
athletes had domestic violence criminal complaints filed against them between 1990 and 1996, 
yet only twenty-eight resulted in convictions and the majority of cases were not prosecuted. This 
same study found that domestic violence cases involving athletes resulted in a 36% conviction 
rate, while the general public had a 75% conviction rate.
52
 
“Often police work harder collecting autographs than evidence.”53 The media and fans, 
including those on the jury, tend to side with the “icon” over the victim. Whether stopped for a 
speeding ticket or arrested for battering a woman, the athlete encounters a legal system in which 
the scales are tipped in his favor. One particularly denotative event occurred when MLB slugger 
Barry Bonds appeared before a judge in a civil case involving domestic violence allegations. The 
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judge found in favor of Bonds and then asked for the player’s autograph. “No part of our culture 
seems entirely immune from the awe and fanfare of professional sports.”54 
 Benedict suggests that juries may also be partial to athletes, as was demonstrated earlier in 
the Jim Brown case, where the jury only found him liable for vandalism. Similar to Jim Brown is 
the case of former Colorado Rocky pitcher, Marcus Moore, who was charged with assaulting and 
raping his girlfriend.
55
 By the time the alleged assault went to trial, Moore had been sent down to 
pitch for the Rockies’ AAA affiliate minor league team, the Colorado Springs Sky Sox. The jury 
acquitted Moore of the rape charge because they felt that him being traded down to the minor 
leagues “was punishment enough.”56  
A common jury misconception is the fact that women “keep coming back for more.” The jury, 
who is often times not educated in the area of battered women, ask themselves “why didn’t she 
just leave?” when the answer is not so simple. This reinforces the archaic idea that “she asked for 
it.” Juries are asking the question “why doesn’t she leave” instead of “why doesn’t he stop beating 
her?” 57 
Another reason athletes are not prosecuted as often in cases of domestic violence is because 
charges are frequently dropped and do not result in conviction. Victims commonly back away 
from allegations because they fear their abuses or do not want to disrupt their families.
58
  
As for punishment by the leagues, it has been a longstanding theory that domestic violence is 
a private matter that does not belong in the public arena.  One study, albeit dated, indicated that 
out of 141 athletes reported to the police for violence against women between 1989 and 1994, 
league officials disciplined only one. However, this number has increased since 1994.
59
 
Traditionally leagues have not addressed domestic violence because of the presence of the 
criminal justice system. The leagues did not want to be “playing police,” and believed domestic 
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violence to be a societal problem with laws already in place that govern it. Another argument 
against league punishment is that violence against women does not affect the game itself the way 
that drug use or gambling can cause an unfair outcome and ruin the competitive balance of the 
game. “Gambling and drug use reduce the public’s belief in the honesty and fairness of the 
athletic contest.”60   
A concern among athletes themselves is the governmental interest. After a domestic violence 
dispute between former Houston Oiler quarterback Warren Moon and his wife Felicia, Moon’s 
agent, Leigh Steinberg said, “He has faced his own conduct. He has admitted it privately and 
publicly…what societal value is protected by arresting Warren Moon?”61 The governmental as 
well as league interest in prosecuting athlete abusers is the fact that these men are regarded as role 
models and heroes. Athletes, most notably NBA greats Dennis Rodman and Charles Barkley, 
often argue that they do not wish to be “role models.”62 The answer to these athletes is simple, too 
bad.  “Like it or not… their unique place in society requires a unique response.” Too many of 
these “heroes” have walked away from domestic violence incidents without a mark on their 
records or damage to their reputation. Athletes are human and they make human mistakes, but too 
often they are not held to “human” standards but rather “superhuman” ones.63 This standard 
includes acceptance or indifference by the leagues, teams, coaches, other players, the media, and 
fans, which allows this epidemic of violence to fester and proliferate.  
The criminal justice system as well as the leagues should enforce domestic violence laws 
because discipline of athlete abusers may be necessary to protect the public image of the game. 
Misconduct by the players can be detrimental to the league’s success, which can translate to a 
financial loss.  Further, discipline of athlete-abusers is desirable as a matter of public policy. 
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“Although awareness is growing, domestic assaults continue to be marginalized as ‘family 
disputes’ and therefore treated as if they were less reprehensible than other crimes.”64  
IV. League and Team Intervention  
The primary disciplinary authorities in professional sports are the sports leagues and teams. 
The leagues being considered are the National Football League (“NFL”), The National Basketball 
Association (“NBA”), and Major League Baseball (“MLB”). Currently the only major 
professional sports league that has a written formal policy for disciplining athletes accused or 
convicted of domestic violence or sexual assault is the NFL.
65
 However, it is clear from past 
league action that certain off-field conduct is a consideration of team and league evaluation and 
discipline of players.
66
 Leagues have condemned off-field conduct including drug use and 
gambling. However, domestic violence has been largely ignored.
67
 After O.J. Simpson was 
accused of domestic violence (before the murder trial), he was not punished by the league or his 
team, and in fact retained his endorsement deals with Hertz and NBC Sports.
68
 Though after the 
murders, the NFL sent counselors to twenty-eight team training camps to discuss domestic 
violence with players. Then-Commissioner Paul Tagliabue adopted the Violent Crime Policy in 
1997, which was further revised in 2000, becoming a version of the current Personal Conduct 
Policy, which is the only policy of its kind among major U.S. sports.
69
  
It is in the league’s best interest to be proactive about domestic violence as well as punish 
domestic abusers. While an argument for vicariously liability would probably fail because 
domestic abuse does not typically take place within the scope of employment, it is still in the 
league’s best interest to keep their players out of trouble and to keep focus on the task at hand; 
which is to win the game and to entertain the public.  
 13 
The leagues and teams have taken the role of disciplinarian in instances of on-field violence. 
Off-field criminal conduct should be treated no differently. The rationale for disciplining players 
who are violent during a game or contest is that they sully the image of game, undermine its 
integrity, and pose a risk to others. Domestic violence and sexual assault arguably have precisely 
the same effects on the game.
70
 
A. Collective Bargaining Agreements  
 Collective bargaining is a process by which a group of workers of an industry bargain or 
negotiate, as a collective unit with the management, to determine working conditions, benefits, 
and salaries of the industry.
71
 The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) is set up to allow the 
management and labor employees, and in this case players, to co-exist peacefully. The National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) governs collective bargaining. The National Labor Relations Board, 
(NLRB) enforces the law by policing unfair labor practices committed by either labor or 
management in the scope of bargaining.
72
  The three principal participants in collective bargaining 
within the arena of sports are government, the management, and labor. Other participants include 
the league commissioner and agents, as well as mediators and arbitrators. Collective bargaining in 
professional sports focuses on two primary areas; first, distribution, as it relates to the division of 
revenue between owners and players, and second, the desire of the parties to assure competitive 
balance and the general health of the league and its market opportunity.
73
 
The scope of bargaining is defined in the NLRA as including wages, hours and working 
conditions. These topics are considered by the NLRB to be mandatory subjects of bargaining that 
must be negotiated in good faith.
74
  Other contents of the agreement include specification of 
contract length, compensation, rules for utilization of labor, individual job rights, rights of union 
and management in the bargaining relationship, methods of enforcing, interpreting and 
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administering the agreement, and discipline. A major concern in sports has centered on discipline 
for aberrant behavior such as violence, gambling, and drug abuse.
75
  
Under antitrust and labor law, two types of labor exemptions exist, statutory and nonstatutory. 
The source of the labor exemption is found in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 29, and the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113.
76
 The statutory exemption does not extend to 
agreements or actions between unions and non-labor groups, including employers. The 
nonstatutory exemption exempts certain anticompetitive union-employer activities from antitrust 
liability.
77
 A union-employer agreement must meet three requirements to qualify for the 
exemption. First, the restraint of trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective 
bargaining agreement, second, the agreement concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining, and 
third, the agreement is a product of bona fide arm’s length bargaining.78  
CBA agreements and employment contracts require players to agree to abide by the rules that 
their teams or leagues may adopt. One issue that arises is “whether the player has given his 
consent to be bound by the particular disciplinary rules.”79 One area in which all of the leagues 
have implemented disciplinary rules is that of drug use, done primarily through collective 
bargaining.
80
 For example, the Substance Abuse Policy adopted by the NFL in 1990 suggested 
that it was important to ban drug use by athletes because of the message it sends to young people 
who may be tempted to use drugs.
81
 Also the ban would protect the integrity of the public 
confidence in the game. Additionally, the MLB drug policy, discussed infra, has been collectively 
bargained for. 
Athletes who abuse women also send the wrong message to youth, and the public in general. 
Specific language and rules pertaining to violence against women should be incorporated into the 
collective bargaining agreement of each league. This would entail negotiating with the union to 
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reach a mutually agreeable policy. If a domestic violence policy was the subject of collective 
bargaining and mutually agreed upon, it would be less susceptible to aggrieved players’ claims if 
the players, through their union, were involved in constructing the policy. This approach also 
seems attractive because it would give all athletes, the majority of whom are non-violent, the 
opportunity to participate in combating the problem and make a statement against this violence. It 
may be inferred that the players who disagree with this type of language being incorporated into 
the CBA may not want to voice their objections in front of their teammates. How will these 
players look if they wish to “reserve the right to beat their wives?” It would look incredibly grim 
for the players who refused to add this type of langue; are they then suggesting that they reserve 
the right be able to beat their wives and girlfriends without receiving punishment from the 
leagues? 
B. Uniform Player Contracts and Individual Player Contracts  
The power given to individual teams to take disciplinary actions against athletes for domestic 
violence and sexual assault arises from employment contracts with the players.
82
 However, teams 
seldom discipline a player unless his crime was particularly egregious. For example, Tim Barnett 
was disciplined by the Kansas City Chiefs only after he was arrested on a third sexual assault 
charge, one that involved a fourteen-year-old girl.
83
 Teams can address the issue of domestic 
violence directly in the players’ employment contracts through the use of the morals clause.  
A morals clause is a contractual provision that gives one contracting party (usually a 
company) the unilateral right to terminate the agreement, or take punitive action 
against the other party (usually an individual whose endorsement or image is sought) 
in the event that such other party engages in reprehensible behavior or conduct that 
may negatively impact his or her public image and, by associate, the public image of 
the contracting company.
84
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In 1998, Ellen E. Dabbs, author of Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 
proffered that teams should move towards including morals clauses in all players’ employment 
contracts, similar to those in sportscasters’ contracts.85 She then stated, “Critics suggest that it is 
unlikely that athletes’ contracts will ever include morals clauses because, unlike sportscasters, 
athletes are not replaceable.”86 Though Dabbs’ predictions were wrong and player contracts do 
indeed include morals clauses today, the question to be answered is whether or not these player 
clauses are enforced as harshly as broadcasters. 
In January 2011, ESPN fired veteran broadcaster Ron Franklin for calling a female colleague 
"sweet baby." Franklin had worked at ESPN for nearly 24 years, primarily as a play-by-play 
announcer on college football and basketball games.
87
 Similarly in May 2011, Toronto 
broadcaster Damian Goddard was fired after posting on Twitter that he was anti-gay marriage. 
Goddard wrote, “I completely and whole-heartedly support Todd Reynolds and his support for the 
traditional and TRUE meaning of marriage."
88
 Dabbs was right, however, by stating that 
sportscasters are replaceable. There are many men who can look nice in a suit and speak 
eloquently about sports. However, how many Kobe Bryant’s are out there? 
The NBA is vested with the power to punish players through its constitution and a “good 
moral character” clause of the standard player contract.89 Players who do not conform their 
personal conduct to standards of good morals and citizenship can be sanctioned for their actions 
in an effort to protect the best interests of the game. The NFL and MLB each have similar 
clauses.
90
  
Some individual MLB teams have taken a stance against domestic violence, for example the 
Seattle Mariners developed the “Refuse to Abuse” program implementing a strict one-strike 
policy against violent players.
91
 However, policies remain inconsistent from team to team. Since 
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the league itself has not adopted a policy to address such conduct, it is not surprising that the 
individual teams do not take it upon themselves to implement such policies. There must be 
uniformity. “MLB Commissioner Bud Selig has not taken a stance on domestic violence and the 
integrity of his league has been undermined. Individual teams do not have a profit-motive to 
discipline violent players when they know that those players will simply find homes elsewhere, 
with teams that do not have strict off-field conduct policies.”92 
Morals clauses allow teams to discipline players for off-the-field conduct that could damage 
the goodwill or reputation of the team.  Because teams are driven by economic incentive to keep 
their best players actively participating in competition, teams do not uniformly use this power. 
C. Commissioner’s Unilateral Rule Making Authority  
The commissioners or presidents of the various professional sports leagues notoriously 
possess dominant powers in governing league matters. The creation of the commissioner was the 
result of the ruling in American League Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson. MLB created the 
commissioner position as an autonomous entity, separate from the league, with authority to 
discipline players for off the field conduct.
93
 American League Baseball Club held that the 
president was authorized to enforce the playing rules of the game and could suspend a player for 
violation of those rules, but the president did not have the authority to discipline a player for 
conduct committed off the field.
94
  
The source of the commissioner’s powers is the league constitution and bylaws.95 Thus, a 
dispute concerning the scope of a commissioner’s authority requires construction of the intent of 
league members in drafting and adopting the league constitution. The collective bargaining 
agreement between management and labor may modify, limit, or otherwise affect the power of the 
commissioner as established by the league constitution.
96
 For example, commissioner decisions in 
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player disciplinary matters are usually subject to review through arbitration.
97
 The constitutions 
and bylaws of most professional sports leagues broadly authorize the commissioners to take 
discretionary action in many areas, particularly disciplinary matters involving players, clubs, front 
office personnel, owners, and others.
98
 League commissioners may use their authority to deal with 
individual instances of sexual assault or domestic violence, but there are few examples of them 
doing so. For example, former NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue disciplined only one player for 
violence against a woman; former Eagles offensive tackle Kevin Allen, who was denied reentry 
into the NFL in 1990 after serving a 33-month prison term for rape.
99
  
Commissioners are also granted an independent disciplinary authority. “Because players agree 
to abide by league bylaws, constitutions, and collective bargaining agreements, the commissioner 
generally has the authority to investigate and punish players for “conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of, or public confidence, in the game.”100 In Milwaukee American Ass’n. v. Landis, the 
commissioner was granted an almost unlimited discretion in the determination of whether or not a 
certain set of facts creates a situation detrimental to the national game of baseball. 
Under the Major League agreement the office of commissioner was created, and 
his functions were defined as follows: "(a) To investigate, either upon complaint or 
upon his own initiative, any act, transaction or practice charged, alleged or suspected 
to be detrimental to the best interests of the national game of baseball; with authority 
to summon persons and to order the production of documents; and, in case of refusal 
to appear or produce, to impose such penalties as are hereinafter provided. "(b) To 
determine, after investigation, what preventive, remedial or punitive action is 
appropriate in the premises, and to take such action either against Major Leagues, 
Major League Clubs or individuals, as the case may be."
101
  
 
 The commissioner could find that acts of domestic violence are acts that are detrimental to 
the best interests of the game, which would result from impairment of public confidence. There 
should be public support for penalizing a player who was found to have committed an act of 
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domestic violence or sexual assault by a commissioner acting under his independent disciplinary 
authority.  
The NFL, NBA, and MLB all have provisions in their respective constitutions that allows a 
commissioner to act in the best interests of the game.
102
 The NFL Constitution allows the 
commissioner to bar anyone from professional football if he or she is guilty of conduct 
detrimental to the best interests of football.
103
 The NBA Constitution grants the commissioner 
power to fine and suspend a player on similar grounds. MLB commissioners have historically had 
broad disciplinary powers, which have been used to protect the sanctity of the game while 
preserving a “competitive balance in baseball.”104 Adjudication of the “detrimental” conduct is 
not necessarily a requirement for commissioners to exercise their independent disciplinary 
authority.
105
  
The MLB’s commissioner has expansive authority to take disciplinary action that is 
detrimental to the best interests of the came.
106
 “The uniform player contract (UPC) incorporated 
by reference to the Basic Agreement (MLB’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA)) in Article 
III, pledges players to ‘abide by and comply with all provisions of the Major League 
Constitution.’”107 These broad powers have been constrained by the implementation of the 
impartial arbitrator who will use “just cause” as the standard of review. Players can challenge a 
commissioner’s decision to sanction him based on the fact that the commissioner was acting 
arbitrarily or fraudulently. However, this independent arbitrator can somewhat undermine the 
authority of the commissioner.
108
 For example, in an arbitration dealing with Los Angeles 
Dodgers relief pitcher Steve Howe, Arbitrator George Nicolau reduced Howe’s sentence from 
banishment from the sport to a one-year suspension, after Howe’s seventh incident of illegal drug 
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use during the span of his twelve-year career.
109
 The grievance procedure routinely undermines 
the authority that the commissioner and teams have in disciplining their players. 
Traditionally the courts have granted the commissioner “almost unlimited discretion in the 
determination of whether or not a certain set of facts creates a situation detrimental to the national 
game of baseball.”110 In Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, the court said, “While it is true that 
professional baseball selected as its first Commissioner a federal judge,
111
 it intended only him 
and not the judiciary as a whole to be its umpire and governor.” This broad discretion granted to 
the commissioner from the courts can be extended to disciplinary actions.  
 The NBA CBA includes sentencing guidelines regarding off-court conduct when a player 
is convicted of a violent felony.
112
 This includes a plea of guilty, no contest, or nolo contendere. 
“The NBA, for a minimum of ten games, shall immediately suspend the player.”113 Here, the 
main difference from the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, discussed infra, is that a player must be 
convicted, not just accused. Sexual assault and domestic violence are specifically enumerated as 
examples of this violent conduct. Also, “When the NBA and the Players Association agree that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that a player has engaged in any type of off-court violent 
conduct, the player will be required to undergo a clinical evaluation and, if deemed necessary by 
such expert, appropriate counseling.”114 While this may prove helpful, this is not discipline.  
The NBA has seen similar impingements on the authority of the commissioner through the 
independent arbitrator.
115
 The independent arbitrator can decide if a punishment is too severe. For 
example, Latrell Sprewell of the Golden State Warriors had his contract terminated with the team 
and was given a one-year unpaid suspension from Commissioner Stern after threatening to kill 
and strangling his coach for ten to fifteen seconds. Arbitrator John Feerick concluded that 
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“fairness dictated that the sentence was too severe” because he had been punished by both his 
team and the league, and reduced Sprewell’s suspension to sixty-eight games.116 
NBA Commissioner David Stern has used his best interests powers to discipline players 
for conduct detrimental to the sports, even if the conduct occurs off the court. The CBA now 
includes provisions regarding team and league discipline for unlawful violence and violent 
misconduct that occurs off-court. Article VI, Section 8(a) specifically identifies sexual assault and 
domestic violence as instances of punishable misconduct. Teams and leagues have undertaken 
some direct punishment in several cases.
117
 Metta World Peace, formerly known as Ron Artest, 
was suspended for 7 games after he pleaded no contest to infliction of injury on his wife, Kimsha 
Artest. He was also sentenced to one hundred hours of community service and ordered to 
participate in a ten-day work project.
118
 
However in the NFL, according to the NFL CBA, any action taken against a player for 
conduct detrimental to the integrity of the game may only be appealed to the commissioner. 
Hence, there is no independent arbitrator to possibly undermine the commissioner’s disciplinary 
action for off-field conduct. Therefore, the NFL commissioner has the most authority in 
disciplining players for their off-field conduct.
119
  
MLB and NBA players who are unhappy with disciplinary rules by the commissioner can 
appeal to an independent arbitrator, or players can file antitrust suits against the league in federal 
court. However these actions have not been very successful because of the non-statutory labor 
exemption that has emerged and has been used by management to avert antitrust claims.
120
  
Note, baseball enjoys a unique exemption from antitrust laws because the sport is local in 
nature and therefore not subject to Congressional regulation under the interstate commerce 
clause.
121
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1. NFL Personal Conduct Policy as Compared to  
The NFL’s controlling documents, including the CBA, the League’s Constitution and Bylaws, 
and the NFL’s Uniform Player Contract, provide the foundations for the commissioner’s authority 
to discipline players for misconduct occurring off the field.  All of these documents authorize the 
commissioner to take disciplinary action whenever a players conduct is found to be “detrimental 
to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”122  The Uniform 
Player Contract in the CBA require players to contractually agree that the commissioner has the 
right to discipline a player if the player is guilty of conduct reasonably judged by the League 
Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or professional football.
123
 The major difference 
between the Personal Conduct Policy and the previous Violent Crime Policy from 1997 is the 
former does not require a commissioner to wait until the criminal justice system has disposed of a 
matter.
124
 The policy requires a player to act in “a way that is responsible, promotes values upon 
which the League is based, and is lawful.”  
The policy states:  
“It is not enough simply to avoid being found guilty of a crime. Instead, 
as an employee of the NFL or a member club, you are held to a higher standard 
and expected to conduct yourself in a way that is responsible, promotes values 
upon which the League is based, and is lawful. Persons who fail to live up to this 
standard of conduct are guilty of conduct detrimental and subject to discipline, 
even where the conduct itself does not result in conviction of a crime.”125 
 
Domestic violence is specifically listed as a crime for which discipline may be imposed, as 
is “conduct that imposes inherent danger to the safety and well being of another person; and 
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conduct that undermines or puts at risk the integrity and reputation of the NFL, NFL clubs, or 
NFL players.”126 
 Prior to 1997, no NFL commissioner had disciplined a convicted domestic abuser even 
though fifty-six current and former NFL players were reported for violent behavior toward 
women between January 1989 and November 1994. The policy enables the league to take action 
and thereby reduces erratic and inconsistent punishments, like those found in baseball. The fact 
that commissioner decisions may not be appealed to an impartial arbitrator also enables the 
system to run efficiently and prevents the commissioner’s authority from being undermined.127  
The NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy in 2000 was largely prompted by domestic violence 
crimes committed by football players. The policy originally allowed the commissioner to take 
disciplinary action on a player charged with any violent crime (felony or misdemeanor) and it 
required the player to go to counseling and participate in clinical evaluations. The policy also 
required the commissioner to wait until the criminal justice system had concluded its process 
before imposing punishment, precluding immediate action. In the first two years, league officials 
reported that the number of player arrests for violent crimes dropped from 38 players in 1997 to 
26 players in 1999.
128
  
Specific acts requiring disciplinary measures include the use or threat of violence, domestic 
violence and other forms of partner abuse, and sex offenses, in addition to other criminal offenses 
and substance abuse violations.  
The current NFL Personal Conduct Policy allows the NFL to impose “longer suspensions and 
larger fines.”129 Ben Roethlisberger’s suspension in 2010 (for the first four games of the 2010 
season, reduced originally from six games) was not imposed on the basis of a conviction, criminal 
charges or even an arrest, but instead, was imposed on the basis of a victim’s allegation of sexual 
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assault. Due to insufficient evidence, prosecutors determined the allegations could not be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the NFL decided to discipline Roethlisberger under the 
League’s Personal Conduct Policy because this particular incident with a 20-year-old college 
student was part of a larger pattern of his conduct with women.
130
  
“The League’s Personal Conduct Policy does not require the NFL’s commissioner to 
prove that a player committed misconduct under either the criminal standard of 
‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ or even the lesser civil burden of ‘by a preponderance of 
the evidence.’ Rather, under the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy, discipline may be 
imposed whenever a player’s misconduct is found to be ‘detrimental to the integrity’ 
of the League.”  
 
The determination as to whether or not conduct is considered “detrimental” to the League is 
left to the commissioner’s discretion. 
In 2004 Tampa Bay Buccaneers running back Michael Pittman was suspended for three 
games after forcefully driving his Hummer into a car driven by his wife, carrying his two-year-old 
child and a babysitter. 
131
 
In the NFL, the commissioner’s disciplinary action will preclude or supersede any action 
taken by the clubs. The NFL has no independent arbitrator available to review, and possibly 
undermine, the commissioner’s disciplinary action for off-field conduct.132  As previously 
mentioned, in other leagues, such as the NBA and MLB, players can appeal to independent 
arbitrators if they are not happy with the commissioner’s disciplinary authority. In support of the 
policy, NFL Commissioner Goodell he has stated, “The highest standards of conduct must be met 
by everyone in the NFL because it is a privilege to represent the NFL, not a right.”133 The NFL 
reported that, in the first year the new Personal Conduct Policy was in effect, the number of 
incidents decreased by twenty percent. “Since the disciplinary measures are coupled with 
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rehabilitative tactics, such as counseling, the NFL’s policy is both strict and compassionate-
unruly, violent players are no allowed to play in the NFL; however, second chances exist.”  
While the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy is without a doubt a large leap in the right 
direction of tackling the issue of domestic violence, it is not without fault. First, it has not been 
incorporated into the NFL’s CBA. Arguably, fines for domestic violence can fall within 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. Also, convictions are not necessary for punishment. Before 
implementing the policy, Commissioner Goodell reached out to the Players’ Association and 
then-executive director Gene Upshaw for guidance. The fact that he did this gives him a strong 
basis against challenges to the policy, however the policy would be less open to challenge if it 
were incorporated into the CBA.
134
 
 
V. Proposals; Three Strikes and You’re Out, Really! 
 
 
MLB and the NBA should implement league-wide policies addressing violent off-field 
conduct similar to the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy. However, these policies should limit 
commissioner discretion by providing sentencing guidelines. Punishments need to be defined to 
ensure that there are no arbitrary sentences based on veteran players. More importantly, the 
policies should then be incorporated into the CBA of the respective leagues, rather than place the 
burden of disciplining domestic violence on the teams, thereby reducing the temptation of teams 
to grant leniency to some players while not to others. 
Specific guidelines for disciplining domestic violence should mirror MLB’s steroid policy. 
This would shift the focus from retroactive punishment to proactive policies that will spell out 
specific penalties and procedures. According to the MLB’s Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment 
Program, a player who tests positive for a performance enhancing substances will receive the 
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following punishments; the first positive test result will result in a 50 game suspension. The 
second positive test will result in a 100 game suspension. The third positive test will result in 
lifetime ban from MLB, provided, however, that a player so suspended may apply, no earlier than 
one year following the imposition of the suspension, to the commissioner for discretionary 
reinstatement after a minimum period of two years.
135
 All suspensions are without pay. Game 
suspensions should be in proportion with games played in a season. For example, a first offense 
fifty game suspension in the NFL would be equivalent to more than three years of suspension. 
This type of policy will put players on notice of what will happen to them if they are in violation 
of these rules.  
Another avenue of prevention would be to add special conduct clauses to individual 
contracts for players that have previously been charged with certain offenses, including violence 
against women. However this might be difficult because more experienced and well known 
players with “superstar” agents may be able to negotiate their way around this.  
Finally, a burden should be placed on the general public to place external pressure on the 
leagues and teams to punish this type of behavior by not buying tickets and merchandise and 
forcing player endorsements to suffer. Greater outrage should be heard among fans and 
endorsements should go unoffered because domestic violence is detrimental to the best interests 
of the game. For example, when Jason Kidd returned from a four game (voluntary) absence after a 
domestic violence dispute, Kidd was booed repeatedly by opposing team fans when he came 
anywhere near the ball. 
The best way to implement policies similar to the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy is 
through the collective bargaining process. All of the professional sports leagues should combine 
what the NFL did with the Personal Conduct Policy, with what the MLB has done with their 
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steroid policy. Though the commissioner may unilaterally implement rules regarding permissive 
subjects, however he cannot unilaterally implement rules regarding mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, which include wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. “Failure 
to negotiate with the Players’ Association regarding mandatory subjects is a violation of the duty 
to collectively bargain and is an unfair labor practice.” For this reason, collective bargaining a 
domestic violence policy that abides by “three strikes and you’re out!” will ensure strict 
enforcement.  
VI. Conclusion 
While domestic violence remains a difficult societal issue, “The average wife beater or serial 
sex offender, if there is such a thing, does not endorse Nike shoes or make public services 
announcements.”  Though professional athletes do not lead average lives, they are not entitled to 
escape average punishments. Teams, leagues, and commissioners all possess the legal authority to 
discipline athlete abusers. However, incorporating domestic violence policies outlining specific 
disciplinary action that ends a player’s athletic career after “three strikes” into the collective 
bargaining process would be the most effective way to diminish domestic violence in professional 
sports.   
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